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The USA PATRIOT Act, P.L. 107-56, enacted to help track down and punish
terrorists and to prevent further terrorism, contains no provisions specifically directed
at libraries or their patrons.  It has several provisions, however, that might apply in a
library context.  The most frequently mentioned of these is Section 215 that amends the
business record sections of the Foreign Surveillance Intelligence Act (FISA).  Section
215 is scheduled to expire on December 31, 2005.  The House and the Senate have
approved bills that would postpone expiration and modify the provisions of Section 215,
H.R. 3199 and S. 1389.
Before the USA PATRIOT Act, federal authorities, engaged in gathering foreign
intelligence information or conducting an investigation of international terrorism, could
seek a FISA court order for access to hotel, airline, storage locker, or car rental business
records.  The businesses to whom the orders were addressed were bound to silence.
Section 215 amended the procedure so that in a foreign intelligence or international
terrorism investigation federal authorities may obtain a FISA order for access to any
tangible item no matter who holds it, including by implication library loan records and
the records of library computer use.
Although past practices have apparently made the library community apprehensive,
the extent to which the authority of Section 215 has been used, if at all, is unclear.
Media accounts of federal investigations involving library patrons ordinarily do not
distinguish between simple inquiries, grand jury subpoenas, criminal search warrants,
FISA physical search orders, and FISA tangible item orders.  Moreover, the Justice
Department has indicated that as of March 30, 2005 the authority under Section 215 had
been exercised on 35 occasions, but had not been used in any instance to secure library,
bookstore, gun sale or medical records.
  Related CRS papers include CRS Report RL33027, USA PATRIOT Act:
Background and Comparison of House- and Senate-Approved Reauthorization and
Related Legislative Action; CRS Report RL32186, USA PATRIOT Act Sunset:
Provisions That Expire on December 31, 2005; and CRS Report RL32907, Security and
Freedom Ensured Act (SAFE Act)(H.R. 1526) and Security and Freedom Enhancement
Act (SAFE Act) (S. 737): Section by Section Analysis.
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Background.  The USA PATRIOT Act (the Patriot Act), P.L. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (2001), was enacted in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 to
provide federal authorities “with the appropriate tools required to intercept and obstruct
terrorism.”  The act has no provisions that mention libraries as such and does not appear
to have any provisions directly aimed at libraries.  The ALA and some its members appear
to be particularly concerned, however, about the impact upon them of provisions of more
general application, particularly amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA), 50 U.S.C. 1801-1862. 
In fact, the American Library Association (ALA) Council has recently adopted a
resolution that, among other things, declares that the ALA “considers sections of the USA
PATRIOT Act ... a present danger to the constitutional rights and privacy rights of library
users and urges the United States Congress to: 1. provide active oversight to the
implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act and other related measures ... and 3. amend
or change the sections of these laws and the guidelines that threaten or abridge the rights
of inquiry and free expression....” Resolution on the USA Patriot Act and Related
Measures That Infringe on the Rights of Library Users (January 29 2003), available at
[http://www.ala.org]. 
The sensitivity of the library community may be attributable in part to its experience
with a past investigative program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  Beginning
in the early 1960’s, Soviet intelligence services apparently sought to systematically collect
unclassified information available in U.S. libraries, particularly scientific and other
technical libraries.  The practice seems to have included  research by Soviet agents and
the employment of innocent university students to do the research.  In order to keep
abreast of Soviet activities, the FBI solicited the assistance of librarians in the institutions
that might be targeted by the Soviets and formalized the approach at least in the New
York area as the Library Awareness Program.  When the program’s existence came to
light, the library community objected vehemently, and the program was apparently
dropped, see generally, FBI Counterintelligence Visits to Libraries: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); The FBI’s Library Awareness Program: Is Big Brother Reading
Over Your Shoulder? 65 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1532 (1990).
Legal Environment.  The FBI has authority to conduct both criminal and foreign
intelligence investigations, 28 U.S.C. 533-535; 28 C.F.R. §0.85.  The judges of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance court, assigned from elsewhere on the federal bench to
a court established under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), may authorize
FBI agents conducting a foreign intelligence investigation to wiretap, conduct physical
searches, or use pen registers or trap and trace devices (instruments to secretly identify the
source and addressees of telephone calls made to and from a particular telephone), 50
U.S.C. 1801-1846.  The FBI enjoys similar judicially-assisted, investigative powers in
criminal cases, 18 U.S.C. 2510-2522, 2701-2708, 3121-3127.  In addition, without
recourse to the courts, the FBI in foreign intelligence cases may issue so-called national
security letters (NSL) demanding a limited amount of customer identifying information
from communications, financial, and credit reporting concerns, 18 U.S.C. 2709, 12 U.S.C.
3414, 15 U.S.C. 1681.  
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Although the library community stoutly defends the importance of library-patron
confidentiality, federal law has yet to recognize its privileged status, F.R.Evid. 501; 22
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE, §§5430, 5431
(1980 & 2002 Supp.)(nevertheless suggesting that a limited research privilege akin to a
newsman’s privilege might some day be recognized).  Notwithstanding any intrusion upon
library-patron confidentiality, as a general rule libraries and librarians must comply with
federal grand jury subpoenas, federal search warrants, and other federal court orders.
Moreover, federal investigators are free to request and receive any assistance from
libraries and librarians that they are willing to provide.
The Patriot Act amended and generally expanded the judicially-assisted criminal and
foreign intelligence investigative powers and the NSL authority as well.  Moreover,
Section 215 of the Patriot Act amended the FISA provisions authorizing FISA court
orders for FBI access to business records and other tangible items in foreign intelligence
and international terrorism investigations.  It is Section 215 that is most often mentioned
when the Patriot Act’s impact upon libraries is discussed.
Business Records and Other Tangible Items:  Prior to passage of the Patriot Act,
FISA empowered the judges of the FISA court to grant the FBI access to certain business
records, 50 U.S.C. 1861-1863 (2000 ed.).  As noted below with an emphasis on the
components later changed, the procedure called for the following:
- a FISA court order granting FBI access to the business records of
 -- common carriers (airlines, bus companies, and others in the business of passenger
transportation);
 -- businesses that provided public accommodations (hotels, models, etc.);
 -- storage locker facilities; or
 --vehicle rental agencies;
- either (1) in order to gather foreign intelligence information, i.e., information that
-- related to the U.S. ability to protect against:
   --- attacks or other hostile acts of a foreign power its agents;
   --- sabotage or international terrorism committed by a foreign power its agents; or
   --- clandestine intelligence activities by a foreign power, its intelligence services,
or agents; or
-- related to:
   --- U.S. national defense or security; or 
   --- the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs;
- or (2) in order to conduct an investigation of international terrorism, i.e., of
-- dangerous or violent crimes 
-- apparently intended to 
   --- coerce a civilian population;
   --- influence government policy by coercion; or 
   --- affect government conduct by kidnaping or assassination; and
-- that are committed overseas or are international in nature or effect;
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- upon a specification of a reason to believe that the records sought were those of a
foreign power or one of its agents; and 
- those to whom the order was directed were required to comply and were forbidden to
disclose the existence or specifics of the order.
Section 215 of the Patriot Act rewrote the business records provisions, 50 U.S.C.
1861-1862, so that now:
- a FISA judge may grant an FBI request for an order granting access to any relevant
tangible item (including books, records, records, papers, documents, and other items);
- either (1) in order to gather foreign intelligence information that does not concern an
American, i.e., information that
-- related to the U.S. ability to protect against:
   --- attacks or other hostile acts of a foreign power its agents;
   --- sabotage or international terrorism committed by a foreign power its agents; or
   --- clandestine intelligence activities by a foreign power, its intelligence services,
or agents; or
-- related to:
   --- U.S. national defense or security; or 
   --- the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs;
- or (2) in order to conduct an investigation to protect against international terrorism, i.e.,
-- dangerous or violent crimes 
-- apparently intended to 
   --- coerce a civilian population;
   --- influence government policy by coercion; or 
   --- affect government conduct by kidnaping or assassination; and
-- that are committed overseas or are international in nature or effect;
- or in order to conduct an investigation to protect against clandestine intelligence
activities;
- as long as any investigation of an American is not based solely on the American’s
exercise of his or her 1st Amendment rights; and 
- those to whom the order is directed are required to comply and are forbidden to disclose
the existence or specifics of the order.
Press accounts of the library community’s misgivings mention features introduced
by Section 215 as well as those that pre-date its enactment.  They refer to the fact that
FISA court proceedings are conducted behind closed doors and that record holders and
other custodians of the tangible items covered by a FISA order are bound to secrecy, USA
Today, A3 (December 17, 2002)(“Now, an agent merely must convince the secret Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court that such records could aid a terrorism probe.  Along with
the search warrant comes a gag order”); Miami Herald, 1 (September 1, 2002)(“The FBI
can make its case in a special ‘spy court’ — a secret, closed proceeding....Once contacted
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2  United States Department of Justice, Fact Sheet: USA PATRIOT Act Provisions Set for
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3  See, e.g., Oversight of the USA PATRIOT Act: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (2005), testimony of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales,
available on June 21, 2005 at [http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1439&wit_id=3936].
4  Oversight Hearing on the Implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act: Hearings Before the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 1st Sess. (2005), statement of Deputy Attorney
General James B. Comey, available on June 21, 2005, at [http://judiciary.house.gov/media/
pdfs/comey060805.pdf].
by agents, a librarian can’t tell anyone about the records request”).  These are conditions
that existed before the amendments of Section 215, albeit in a more limited context.
On the other hand, they point out that the FISA provisions that once applied to motel
records now may also reach records relating to the use of a public library’s books and
computers, and allude to the disappearance of the requirement of probable cause or
“reason to believe” that the records involve the activities of a foreign power or its agents,
Contra Consta Times, 35 (October 20, 2002)(“Section 215 allows federal agents to get
a search warrant to examine certain ‘business records’ as part of terrorism investigations,
and that can include records from public libraries”);1 (“... the Patriot Act eliminates the
need to show probable cause before invading a patron’s privacy.  The new law allows the
FBI to go to a secret foreign intelligence court, claim the information desired is part of a
terrorism investigation and walk away with a court order allowing it to take a look at all
the Internet traffic emanating from a library on a particular day.  Moreover, librarians are
prohibited from disclosing anything about law enforcement’s visit”).
It is not clear how often, if at all, the new authority granted by Section 215 might be
used to secure records or other library items.  Accounts in the popular press often speak
in general terms making it difficult to distinguish simple FBI requests, grand jury
subpoenas, criminal search warrants, FISA physical search orders, national security
letters, and FISA tangible item orders.  Justice Department officials have revealed that the
authority had been used on 35 occasions as of March 30, 2005, but had yet to be used to
acquire library, bookstore, gun sale, or medical records.2  They have argued, however, that
terrorists should not be allowed to exploit library and other services with impunity.3    On
the other hand, they concede that Section 215 is not as clearly stated as they might prefer
but have expressed a general willingness to support clarifying amendments.4
Post-USA PATRIOT Act Legislative Developments.  The House and the
Senate have approved somewhat different proposals postponing the expiration of Section
215 and modifying its provisions, the House (H.R. 3199) on July 21, 2005, 151 Cong.
Rec. H6307, and the Senate (S. 1389) on July 29, 2005, 151 Cong. Rec. S9559-562.
Under the House bill, Section 215 sunsets on December 31, 2015; under the Senate bill,
on December 31, 2009.  Both insist that the FBI Director personally approve an
application for a FISA order granting access to library records.  S. 1389 alone requires that
CRS-6
5  The SAFE Act proposals are discussed in CRS Report RL32907, Security and Freedom
Ensured Act (SAFE Act)(H.R. 1526) and Security and Freedom Enhancement Act (SAFE Act)(S.
737): Section by Section Analysis, available in an abridged form as CRS Report RS22140, The
SAFE Acts of 2005: H.R. 1526 and S. 737 — A Sketch.
the items sought pertain to or are relevant to the activities of a foreign power, the agent
of a foreign power, or pertain to an individual in contact with or known to a suspected
agent of a foreign power.  Both explicitly permit recipients of a Section 215 order to
disclose the order to their attorneys and to challenge the order in court.  The procedures
governing such challenges differ.  Only S. 1389 holds Section 215 orders to the same
standards as grand jury subpoenas so that a FISA court may modify or set aside an order
where compliance would be oppressive, unreasonable, or contrary to a federally
recognized privilege, but each bill authorizes the FISA court to modify or set aside an
unlawful order (e.g., an order that fails to comply with statutory requirements).  Only S.
1389 allows the court to modify or set aside an accompanying confidentiality requirement.
FISA court rulings on these challenges are subject to appellate review under both bills.
S. 1389 alone requires that the statistical reports to Congress on the exercise of Section
215 authority include information on its use to secure access to library records and that,
in addition to the intelligence committees, the judiciary committees be supplied with full
reports on the use of Section 215 authority.  
In other legislative action, the House, on June 17, 2005, agreed to an amendment to
the Commerce, State, Justice appropriations bill for FY2006 (H.R. 2862) offered by
Representative Sanders which would preclude the use of funds appropriated under the bill
to implement the authority of Section 215 to acquire library or book store records, 151
Cong. Rec. H4534-542, H4551.  The Senate Appropriations Committee struck the
amendment from its version of the bill, S.Rept. 109-88 (2005).  Representative Sanders
has also introduced a free standing amendment, H.R. 1157,  that would remove library
and bookstore records from the coverage of Section 215 but emphasize that they remain
subject to a FISA physical search order.
In other committee actions the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has  reported
S. 1266 (Senator Roberts), which would make an amended version of Section 215
permanent, S.Rept. 109-85.  The amended section would make explicit the relevancy
threshold standard for issuance of an order; would expressly allow disclosure to the
recipient’s attorney; and would establish a procedure for judicial review of either an order
(unreasonable or oppressive orders might be modified or set aside), the nondisclosure
component of an order (subject to modification absent an FBI certification that disclosure
would endanger national security), or both.  S. 1266 would also establish procedures with
similar features for judicially enforceable administrative subpoenas to be used in national
security investigations.
Other bills address many of the same issues if in a somewhat different manner.  For
instance, rather than a relevancy standard, several would return to a standard of “special
and articulable facts” for the belief that the information pertains to a foreign agent, S. 317
(Senator Feingold), H.R. 1526 (Representative Otter)(SAFE Act), S. 737 (Senator
Craig)(SAFE Act).5   S. 737 would also create a procedure for judicial review and
establish time limits for the nondisclosure requirements contained in the Section’s orders.
